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F R A N Z V O N K U T S C H E R A 
I N D I C A T I V E C O N D I T I O N A L S 
In this paper a semantics and logic of conditional necessity is developed as the basis 
of a logic of indicative and subjunctive conditionals and of causal sentences. It is 
argued, against E . Adams and D. Lewis, that these three types of statements differ 
only in presupposition. 
In "Counterfactuals" (1973) Dav id Lewis has developed a logical system V C 
for counterfactuals. For the normal cases of counterfactuals, in which the an-
tecedent is false, V C can be replaced by V W , a system based on weak instead of 
strong centering. In this paper I shall try to show that this system can also be 
applied to indicative conditionals and can generally be used for a comprehensive 
and unified treatment of the logic of conditionals. The main obstacles in generalizing 
Lewis ' analysis of counterfactuals to include indicative conditionals are, first, that 
the intuitive background he provides for his semantics favours strong centering, 
and, second, an argument by Ernest W . Adams in (1970) to the effect that "sub-
junctive and indicative conditionals a re . . . logically distinct species" so that the 
truth-conditions for the former cannot be derived from those for the latter by 
adding suitable presuppositions. Our first step wi l l be a reconsideration of that 
argument. 
1. A d a m s ' a r g u m e n t 
If counterfactuals derive from indicative conditionals or both from a basic 
type of conditionals then it should be true that: 
(1) an indicative conditional ' If it is the case that A , then it is the case that B ' 
(shortly: ' I f A , then B') has for non-A the same truth conditions as the 
counterfactual ' I f it were the case that A , then it would be the case that B \ 
According to Adams the two following sentences form a counter-example 
to (1), since we consider (2) true and its antecedent false, but (3) false: 
(2) If Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy\ then someone else did. 
(3) If Oswald hadn't shot Kennedy, then someone else would have. 
N o w Lewis and before him N . Goodman, N . Rescher and R. Stalnaker, 
have analyzed the truth conditions of conditionals as dependent upon ceteris-paribifS-
conditions C, not explicitly mentioned in the conditional, that are compatible with 
the antecedent. If we change our assumptions as to the truth or compatability of C 
with A , then we also change our assessment of the truth of the conditional. In 
the example we are only prepared to accept (2) as true if we know that Kennedy 
was indeed shot in Dallas, and if we consider that compatible with Oswald's 
innocence, although this may be very unlikely for us as things stand. If, on the 
other hand, we consider (3) to be false, we take it that Oswald did indeed shoot 
Kennedy and that there was no one else around with intentions or means to 
assassinate the president. We therefore do not consider Kennedy's being shot in 
Dallas compatible with Oswald's innocence.1 So we have changed our assessment 
of the ways things might have been, i f Oswald hadn't shot Kennedy. But (1) 
presupposes that this assessment remain the same for the indicative and the 
counterfactual conditional. 
The difference in our assessment of the truth of (2) and (3) seems to be 
a consequence of the fact that, while (2) speaks about the author of the ki l l ing in 
Dallas, (3) implies that Kennedy was somehow fated to be killed anyhow, which is 
not implied in the logical representation of (3). There are indeed quite a lot of 
differences of meaning in natural language, for instance by a change in topic and 
comment as in Goodmans example of Georgia and New Y o r k 2 , that are not ac-
counted for in the usual straight-forward logical representation. So Adams' example 
is not a conclusive argument against (1). 
2. T y p e s o f c o n d i t i o n a l s 
In traditional grammar three types of conditionals are distinguished: Those 
using the indicative in the antecedent and consequent (indicative conditionals) and 
two forms of subjunctive conditionals. These two forms can be distinguished 
morphologically in some languages, as in Lat in , by their use of present or past 
tense (Si hoc credas, err es vs. Si hoc crederes, errares), but generally they have to be 
determined by the fact that one type (the counterfactual) carries the presupposition 
that the antecedent (and also normally the succedent) is false, while the other type 
(in Lat in potentialis) carries no such presupposition but expresses the speaker's 
opinion that the antecedent is improbable or uncertain. We shall also include causal 
statements of the form "Since it is the case that A , it is the case that B " in our 
investigation of conditionals. Such sentences presuppose that A (and hence B) is 
true. 
The grammatical subdivision of conditionals is of little logical interest since it 
mixes syntactical criteria (mood) with semantical (presupposition) and pragmatical 
Cf. also Lewis (1973), p. 71. 
Cf. Goodman (1965), pp. 14 seq. 
ones (beliefs of the speaker). As we are here only after truth conditions and not 
after expressive meaning components the difference between indicative conditional 
and potentialis is not relevant for us. A n d since we shall not consider partial 
interpretations3 we shall take no account of presuppositions. We want to argue 
that we can get along then with only one type of conditional which we write 
A=>B. We say that A=>B is used as an indicative conditional i f it is undecided 
(for the speaker) whether the antecedent A holds or not. A = ^ B is used as a counter-
factual if (for the speaker) it is a fact that i A . A n d it is used as a causal statement 
"Since it is the case that A , it is the case that B " if (for the speaker) it is a fact 
that A . 4 
We think, therefore, that the difference between the indicative, counter-
factual, and causal conditional is not a difference of truth-conditions but only a 
difference in presupposition. 
If we assert for instance 
(1) IfJack believes that John is married, then he is wrong, 
and are told that Jack does not believe John to be married, then we are com-
mitted to the statement. 
(2) IfJack were to believe that John is married, he would be wrong. 
The reason for asserting (1), viz. that John is not married, is the same as that for 
asserting (2). A n d if we assert (2) we are committed to (1) if we hear that it is 
really uncertain whether Jack believes John to be married or not. 
A n d if I assert (1) then i f I learn that Jack really does believe John to be 
married, then I am committed to the statement 
(3) Since Jack believes that John is married, he is wrong. 
A n d conversely, i f I assert (3) and then learn that it is not sure that Jack believes 
John to be married, I shall say that (1) is true. 
One or a few examples are not conclusive evidence for our thesis of course. 
They just serve to give it a certain intuitive plausibility. Our main argument has 
to be that the semantic analysis of A = ^ B is such that the thesis is intuitively 
adequate. 
3. S i m i l a r i t y o f w o r l d s 
D . Lewis gives several types of semantics for the language of conditionals. 
The intuitively fundamental one is that of comparative similarity systems5. Such systems 
are based on relations j < x k on the set I of possible worlds for all i e I. j < j k 
3 Cf. for instance Kutschera (1974 a). 
4 We shall not discuss the difference between subjective and objective presuppositions 
here. 
5 Cf. Lewis (1973), pp. 48 seq. 
says that the world k is at least as similar to i as j is. j < j k is to be a weak ordering 
for which several conditions hold, among them 
(1) j <c i i for all i , j e l a n d j=#i. 
This is the condition of strong centering, which says that every world is more 
similar to itself than any other world. 
Lewis ' truth condition for A => B is 
(2) A=>B is true in i iff A is impossible or there is an A-wor ld j so that all 
A-worlds that are at least as similar to i as j are B-worlds. 
From (1) we obtain then 
(3) A A B D ( A = > B ) . 
This is harmless for counterfactuals which normally are used only under the 
presupposition that i A . It is unacceptable, however, if we want to interpret 
A=>B as the basic form of conditionals, since every causal conditional would then 
be true. 
If we replace (1) by the condition for weak centering 
0') j < i1 for all i , j e I, 
then (3) is not valid anymore, but the assumption that there is a world, different 
from i , which is to i just as similar as i itself, is counterintuitive. Similarity of 
j and i , according to Lewis, is to be overall-similarity, so that j is the more 
similar to i the more details they have in common and the more important these 
common details are. Since for j =J= i j must in some details, however few and un-
important, be different from i , i itself must certainly be more similar to i than j. 
T o obtain an adequate semantics for our A => B there remain then only two possi-
bilities: Change (2) or change the whole intuitive background of the semantics. 
We might, for instance, change (2) to 
(2) A => B is true in i iff A is impossible or A A B necessary or there is an 
A-wor ld j and a T A-wor ld k so that all A-worlds at least as similar to i 
as j or k are B-worlds. 
In case A is false in i this coincides with (2), i.e. nothing is changed for 
counterfactuals. (2') expresses the fact that A=>B holds if we can infer B from A 
together with a suitable ceteris-paribus-condhion compatible both with A and nA, 
and looks, therefore, like a good candidate for indicative conditionals. The trouble 
with (2'), however, is that the logic we obtain from this condition is too weak. 
Conditionals are a type of inference-relation and though many of the fundamental 
principles valid, for instance, for logical entailment or material or strict implication 
(like the laws of contraposition, strengthening of the premiss or transitivity) are 
not valid for conditionals 6 they are valid in the normal cases. From (2'), however, 
we do not obtain sufficiently strong restrictions of these laws. 
6 Cf. Lewis (1973), 1.8. 
We shall therefore follow the second course and abandon the use of world-
similarities for the interpretation of A=>B altogether. 
4. C o n d i t i o n a l necess i t y 
We shall interpret A B as a statement about conditional necessity and read 
it as " O n condition that A , it is necessary that B " . The notion of conditional 
necessity is a generalization of the usual notion of (unconditional) necessity, as 
conditional probability or conditional obligation are generalisations of the notions 
of (unconditional) probability and obligation. Under different conditions different 
propositions may be necessary. From conditional necessity we obtain two concepts 
of unconditional necessity: proposition p is weakly necessary i f it is necessary on a 
tautologous condition, and p is strongly necessary i f it is necessary under all con-
ditions, p is weakly necessary i f under the given circumstances p is normally the 
case. Therefore A=>B expresses a notion of weak necessity: on condition that A , 
it is normally the case that B . 
Conditional possibility can then be defined by 
D4.1 . A = ^ B : = -,(A=>-iB) 
We read A ^ B as " O n condition that A , it is (weakly) possible that B " . 
A proposition p is unconditionally weakly possible if under the given circumstances 
it would not be abnormal if p were the case. A n d p is strongly possible i f there is a con-
dition under which p is (weakly) possible. 
Before we discuss these intuitive concepts further let me give the formal 
definitions: 
Let d be the language obtained from that of Predicate Logic by stipulating that 
(A=>B) be a sentence i f A and B are. T o economize on brackets -i, A , v are to 
bind stronger and , = weaker than =>, so that we may write 
A A B=>B v C D C = > I A instead of ((A A B)=>(B v C)) => (C=>-i A ) . 
D4.2 . A n interpretation of (£ is a quadruple <U, I, f, <I>> so that: 
(1) U is a non-empty set of (possible) objects. 
(2) I is a non-empty set of (possible) worlds. 
(3) f(i, X ) is a function on I x P(I) (P(I) being the power set of I) so that for all 
i 6 I and X 3 I 
(a) f ( i , X ) c X 
(b) X C Y A f(i, X ) * A => f(i, Y) =|=A7 
(c) X C Y A f(i, Y ) D X * A => f(i, X ) = f(i, Y ) H X 
(d) i e f ( i , I ) 
7 For the sake of brevity we use the logical operators of (£ also as metatheoretical 
symbols. 
(4) For all i 6 I O s is a function from the set of sentences of (£ into the set 
{t, f} of truth values so that 
(a) (a) = ^>j(a) for all j 81 and all individual constants a. 
(b) satisfies the conditions for interpretations of the language of 
Predicate Logic over U . 
(c) O i (A=>B) = t i f f f ( i , A ) c [ B ] , 
where [B] = { j e l : Oj(B) = t}. 
In modal logic we set O j ( N A ) = t iff Sj cz [A], where for all i e l Sj is a 
non-empty subset of I. Sj is the set of worlds possible from the standpoint of i . 
(4c) is the straight-forward generalization for conditional necessity: f(i, A) is the 
set of worlds (weakly) possible under condition that A from the standpoint of i . 
If we set Sj = Uf(i> X ) , then Sj is the set of worlds strongly possible from the 
standpoint of i , i.e. the proposition X is strongly necessary iff Sj c X , and X is 
strongly impossible iff Sj cz X . We construe f so that 
(a) f ( i , X ) = A = S j C z X , 
i.e. f(i, X ) is empty iff X is strongly impossible. This follows from the conditions 
of D4.2(3), and the definition of Sj. If SjCZ X then f(i, X ) = A according to (a). 
If Sj0 X =|=A then there is a Y with f(i, Y)f)X #= A, so according to (c) f(i, X f) Y ) 
= f(i, Y) 0 X =f=A, and according to (b) f(i, X ) =#A. 
From the definition of Sj we obtain 
(ß) S j C X i f f f o r a l l Y c z I f ( i , Y ) c X , 
A n d (a) together with (a) implies 
(Y) S j C z X = f ( i , X ) c z X . 
We can, therefore, define strong necessity and possibility by 
D4.3 . (a) N A : = i A = > A 
(b) M A : = - i N i A , 
while weak necessity and weak possibility are defined by 
D4.4. (a) L A : = T=> A , where T is a tautology, 
(b) P A : = - i L i A . 
N o w condition D4.2(3a) says that all worlds (weakly) possible on condition that X 
are X-worlds . 
Condition (b)—always of D4.2(3)—says that if X is strongly possible and 
X c Y , then Y is strongly possible. This is the law A => B h M A ZD M B of modal 
logic. 
Condition (c) (in view of (a) and (b)) is equivalent to f(i, Y ) f | X = # A 3 
f(i, X 0 Y) = f(i, Y) 0 X ; i.e. i f among the worlds (weakly) possible on condition that 
Y there are some X-worlds , then these are the worlds (weakly) possible on condi-
tion that X and Y . This implies the law of im- and exportation of premisses 
A = ^ B D ( A A B = > C = A = > B D C ) . 
Condition (d) finally says that i is weakly possible from the standpoint of i . 
(d) together with (c) implies the law of modus ponens for conditional necessity: 
A A (A=>B) =>B. A word, perhaps, is also in order on condition D4.2 (4a): A l l 
individual constants are interpreted as standard names. S. Kr ipke has given good 
reasons for such a procedure in (1972). Since we are not interested in existence 
here we have not introduced sets U j of objects existing in i . If E is a one-place 
predicate constant of (£ we could set Oj(E) = U j and define quantification over 
existing instead of possible objects by A . x A [ x ] : = A x ( E x A[x]). 
D4.5 . A n interpretation 9W = <U, I, f, 0> satisfies 2L sentence A in i iff <I>j(A) = t. 
A is valid in Wl iff $R satisfies A for all i 8 I. A n d A is C-valid iff A is valid in 
all interpretations of C 
Our concept of interpretation appears in Lewis (1973), 2.7 as that of a 
model based on a weakly centered selection function. His selection functions, 
however, are introduced on the basis of comparative similarity concepts for which 
only weak centering is counterintuitive, as we have seen. T o arrive at such 
functions—f(i, A ) being interpreted as the set of A-worlds most similar to i—the 
Limit-Assumption has to be assumed, that for all i and A there is an A-wor ld 
most similar to A . Though this makes no difference for the resulting logical system 
it is intuitively not well-founded as Lewis points out, since the similarity of worlds 
may depend on the values of real valued parameters like places, times, masses 
etc. in them. Our approach avoids these difficulties in giving another interpretation 
to the selection functions. 
If we want to consider iterated applications of modal operators the prin-
ciples 
(8) N A z> N N A of C. I. Lewis ' system S4, and 
(8) - . N A D N I N A o fS5 
suggest themselves. As S5 seems to be intuitively most adequate, we may incor-
porate the condition 
(e) j 8 Sj 3 Sj = Si for all jel 
into D4.2(3a). 
If we want to obtain principles for iterated applications of it seems best 
to generalize (5) and (e). The following two conditions are the likeliest candi-
dates : 
(0 A=>B=>L(A=>B) 
(rQ - i ( A = > B ) 3 L i ( A = > B ) . 
These two conditions are equivalent with postulating in D4.2(3) also 
(f) j 8 f(i, I) => f(j, X ) = f(i, X ) for all jel and X c l , 
If we assume 
(£ ) A=>B=>N(A=>B) and 
(if) -I(A=>B) 3 N i ( A = > B ) , 
18a T L I 3 
instead of (Q and (T|), A = ^ B holds iff it holds on all conditions, and does not hold 
iff it holds on no conditions, all conditionals would be necessarily true or false, 
and we would have L A = N A and N ( A ZDB) = A=>B, i.e. conditional necessity 
would coincide with strict implication. 
This is not adequate since it may be true that If my barometer goes up, then 
the atmospheric pressure rises but, since my barometer does not necessarily function 
correctly, it is false that The going up of my barometer strictly implies that the atmospheric 
pressure rises. 
If, on the other hand, we postulate 
(£") A=>B=> A=>(A=>B) and 
(n") I ( A ^ B ) D A ^ I ( A = > B ) 
this would not be intuitively correct, since, i f A=>B holds, then A is a reason for 
B , but not a reason for A ^ B . 
5. T h e l o g i c o f c o n d i t i o n a l neces s i t y 
Let (£ 0 be Predicate Logic plus the following rule and axioms 
C R : A h N A 
C I : A=>A 
C2: N A D B = > A 
C3 : N ( A ZD B) A (C=> A ) => C=>B 
C4: (A=>B) A ( A = > C ) 3 A=>B A C 
C5 : A = * B ZD (A A B=>C = A=>B ZD C) 
C6: A = > B D ( A D B ) 
C7: Ax(A=>B[x]) ZD A=>AxB[x] 
is to be (E 0 plus 
C8: N A D N N A 
C9: H N A D N I N A 
(£2 is to be (£j plus 
CIO: A=>B=>L(A=>B) 
C l l : n(A=>B)=3Li(A=>B). 
The propositional part of (£0> i-e. C 0 minus C5, is equivalent with D . Lewis ' 
system V W in (1973), pp. 132 seq. 
(£o contains the basic modal system M of von Wright (or T of R. Feys) to-
gether with the Barcan formula A x N A [ x ] ZD N AxA[x ] , and therefore ^ contains S5. 
For inference relations > like logical entailment and material or strict impli-
cation the following principles are fundamental: 
(1) A > A 
(2) (A > B) A (B > C) => (A > C) 
(3) (A > B) ZD (A A C > B) 
(4) ( A > B ) 3 ( A > B v C ) 
(5) (A > B A C) = (A > B) A (A > C) 
(6) (A v B > C) = (A > C) A (B > C) 
(7) (A>B)=)(iB>-iA) 
(8) A A ( A > B ) D B 
(9) (A A B > C) = (A > B => C) 
For => in place of > only (1), (4), (5) and (8) hold. In place of (2) we have 
(B=>A) A (A=>B) A (B=>C)=> A=>C, 
in place of (3) 
(A=>C) A (A=>B)=> A A C=>B, 
in place of (6) 
(A v B =>A) A (A v B=>B) => (A v B=>C = (A=>C) A (B=> C)), 
in place of (7) 
-ILB A (A=>B)=>nB=>nA 
and in place of (9) we have C5. 
6. C o n d i t i o n a l necess i t y and c o n d i t i o n a l s 
We have to show now that conditionals can be adequately analyzed in terms 
of statements A=*>B about conditional necessity. 
(A) Indicative Conditionals 
A statement A=*»B may be used as an indicative conditional i f P A A P T A , 
i.e. i f under the given circumstances A and nA are both weakly possible (it may 
very well be the case that A , but also that iA) . N . Goodman's analysis of 
counterfactuals in (1965) can in part be carried over to indicative conditionals. 
Then a sentence (1) " I f A , then B" is not only true i f N ( A =>B) but also if there 
is a relevant condition C , not mentioned in " I f A , then B" so that N ( A A C => B). 
C cannot be a free parameter for then (1) would have no definite truth value. 
C cannot be the conjunction of all true statements, for if A is false (1) would always 
be true since N ( A A I A D B ) . C has to be at least consistent with A . C cannot 
always be true since, on condition that A , C might be an implausible assumption 
if i A . As Goodman has shown, the truth condition " I f A , then B" is true iff 
there is a C so thatnN(A ID-IC) and N ( A A C D B ) violates the principle 
MB A (A=>B)3-i(A=>nB). 
So we wi l l have to choose a stronger relation than T N ( A D I C ) between A 
and C which Goodman calls cotenability. It seems natural to take A = > C in 
place of such a relation. If A ^  C then C is (weakly) necessary or the normal case 
on condition that A , so that assuming A C goes without saying. This accounts 
18b T L I 3 
for C not being mentioned in (1). We then have: 
" I f A , then B " iff there is a condition C such that A=>C and N ( A A C D B ) . 
F rom this it follows that " I f A , then B " holds iff A=>B does. For i f A=>B is 
true we can take A=>B as our C ; then N ( A A C=>B) and (in view of C3) 
A=>C. A n d i f we have A =>C and N ( A A C D B ) , then we have A =^A A C 
(CI and C4) and therefore A =>B, in view of C3. 
This equivalence 
A = > B = C(A=>C A N ( A A C D B ) ) 
also holds for counterfactuals and causal conditionals and so is a valuable argument 
for the correctness of our analysis. 
In the normal case of an indicative conditional " I f A , then B " B is not 
weakly necessary, i.e. we have -iLB. We would, for instance, not normally say 
11 If Nixon is still president next year, then he will be over sixty." 
(1) normally expresses that there is a connection between the facts expressed 
by A and B so that it may very well be that nB if i A. The case L B can be excluded by 
using the strong conditional defined by 
D6.1 . A = > B : = (A=>B) A -i(-iA=>B), 
which implies that nB is (weakly) possible under condition that i A . For -iLB, 
A=>B,and A=>B are equivalent. 
A =>B can be read as " I f it is the case that A , then it may be the case 
that B " . As Lewis points out, such "may"-conditionals (speaking of counter-
factuals he had his eye on "might"-conditionals) also play a role in ordinary 
discourse. They come quite naturally from the standpoint of conditional necessity. 
(B) Counterfactuals 
A = ^ B may be used as counterfactual i f nA. Then we also have PnA. We 
shall not stipulate T P A , i.e. L n A however, since under the given circumstances, 
though A is false, A might very well be possible. So on our definition for P A 
A=>B may be used both as an indicative and a counterfactual conditional, de-
pending on the speakers knowledge, of which we have taken no account in our 
semantics. 
The logic of counterfactuals then coincides with that given by D . Lewis. In 
the normal case of a counterfactual we again have -«LB. If we want to imply that 
B is in fact true, we say " I f it were the case that A , then it would still be the case 
that B " . By use of => instead of => we can exclude this case L B , while for 
- I L B A => B is equivalent again to A => B . 
(C) Causal conditionals 
A=>B may be used as a causal statement (2) "Since it is the case that A , 
it is the case that B " , i f A is true. Then we have P A , but we don't stipulate that 
T P T A , i.e. that A is normally the case. In fact from A=>B and L A we obtain L B , 
so that B is normally the case too; from L A (or P A ) and L B A=>B already 
follows, so that this statement is quite uninformative in case of L A . In ordinary 
discourse, we usually only give reasons for phenomena that are unexpected, 
strange or unusual as for instance J . Kön ig , H . Hart and H . Honore, J . Passmore 
and E . Scheibe have pointed out in their discussions of the notion of explana-
tion. This is not always so, but i L B (and therefore i L A ) , is certainly an important 
case in the use of causal statements. Taking A=>B instead of A = ^ B (equivalent 
with A =>B again in case of - iLB) we do not exclude the case L B , but only i L A A L B 
and give an informative sense to a causal statement in case of L A A L B since 
n(iA=>B) does not follow from L A and L B . A ^ > B then states that A is necessary 
for the weak necessity of B . 
It should finally be emphazised first that a causal conditional "Since A , B " 
does not state that A is a cause of B . As in 
Since my barometer is going up, the atmospheric pressure rises 
or Since the period of the pendulum is t, its length is g ( ^ ) 2 
A may be an effect or a symptom for B that is a reason for believing that B . 
Moreover, A may not be the only possible or actual reason for B . But in A=>B 
i f A were not to be the case then at least B might be false. 
The question, wether CIO and C l l are adequate, is very hard to decide, 
since we lack reliable truth criteria for ordinary language sentences with iterated 
" i f - thenY\ 
Take the following examples of sentences of the form A ^ (B=> C), (A=>B)=> C, 
and A A B = > C : 
(3) IfJohn will come, then ifJack will come too, it will be a nice party. 
(4) IfJack will come in case John comes, it will be a nice party. 
(5) IfJohn andJack will come, it will be a nice party. 
If under the given circumstances it is possible that John wi l l come (PA), 
then (3) according to CIO and C l l is equivalent to 
(6) If Jack will come, then it will be a nice party. 
A n d if under the given circumstances it is possible that Jack wi l l come 
in case John comes (P(A =^B)), (4) is equivalent to 
(7) Under the given circumstance it will be a nice party. 
Under condition that P(A=>B) (5) follows from (3), but is not equivalent 
to (3). 
A l l this is hardly convincing. But I doubt that we can really spell out the 
difference of meaning between (3), (4), and (5). Such constructions are very rare 
so that we have only a narrow basis for a test for the adequacy of CIO and C l l . 
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If we do not want to exclude such iterated "if-then"'s altogether—and we 
wouldn't lose much for ordinary language analyses thereby—then it seems best 
to adopt strong principles that permit us to reduce many such sentences to simple 
"if-then" 's, as C8 and C9 do in Modal Logic . 
7. C o n c l u s i o n 
A n explication of a concept is adequate i f the explicatum is coextensional 
with the explicandum for the great mass of normal instances, and if the explicatum 
is simple and fruitful. I have tried to show that our explication of conditionals 
captures the main ideas that we express by them. The simplicity of the explicatum 
is achieved only by leaving open the question of how to give a precise sense 
to the notion of relative necessity8 and by passing over a lot of problems con-
nected with natural language analyses. 
As for fruitfulness just one example: Many conditional obligations have to 
be analyzed in the form 'If it is the case that A , then it is obligatory that B ' , 
for which a rule of detachment holds, so that we can infer from A that B is 
obligatory? 
If we take the 'if-then' here as a material or a strict implication, this con-
ditional obligation takes no exceptions. As we can think, with a little imagination, 
for almost every current conditional obligation of situations, in which it would 
not hold, i.e. of conditions C so that, i f A A C, then not 0 (B) , we would have 
inconsistency in almost all our normative systems. 1 0 But i f we analyze ' I f A , then 
0 (B ) ' as A=>0(B) , then 0 (B) is only said to be the normal case on condition 
that A , not that 0 (B) holds in A-worlds in which extraordinary circumstances and 
strange coincidences obtain. It may then very well be the case that A=>0(B) , but 
-i(A A C=>0(B)). Such restrictions to normal cases are implied, I think, in most 
every-day statements of conditional obligation. 
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